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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.

The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Dixon's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
Because He Established That He Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
1.

Mr. Dixon proved that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to
counsel's failure to object to the jury trial being held in the county jail

To reach the courtroom in which Mr. Dixon's trial was held, the jury entered ajail
surrounded by razor-wire, passed through jail security and sat behind a glass wall to protect the
jury from inmates. Tr. (39745) p. 53, In. 1-7; Post Trial Briefing in Support of Post-Conviction
Reliefp. 6-7; Affidavit ofStaci Anderson,), 3. This setting constantly reminded the jury ofMr.
Dixon's alleged dangerousness and deprived the process of dignity and neutrality essential to the
integrity of the trial process. Accordingly, the trial setting was inherently prejudicial in violation
ofMr. Dixon's right to due process and he was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to object to
the trial setting.
In arguing to the contrary, the state claims the jail courtroom's physical appearance was
not presented to the district court and, thus, there was no evidence that the jail courtroom in
Kootenai County was similar to arrangements found unconstitutional in other jurisdictions.
Respondent's Brief p. 10. The state also argues that trial counsel was not required to challenge
the arrangement because there was no Idaho case on point and, in any event, the district court
would have denied any motion to change the trial's location.
However, the district court and parties were quite familiar with the jail courtroom and its
physical appearance was thus implicitly judicially noticed by the district court. Further, an
objection to the trial setting would have been supported by existing precedent and multiple cases
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This affidavit is the subject of a contemporaneously filed rcqucst for judicial notice.

from other jurisdictions. Because a jury trial cannot be held within a correctional setting unless
there are substantial safety concerns justifYing the location, the district court would have erred in
denying a motion to change the location. Accordingly, the district court erred in denying Mr.
Dixon's petition for post-conviction relief.
a.

the jail courtroom's physical appearance was considered by the
district court and appropriately considered by this Court on appeal

The state notes that the only description of the jail courtroom's physical appearance in the
appellate record is in post-conviction counsel's argument in post-hearing briefing. Respondent's
Brief, p. 10. The state thus contends that there was "no basis by which the court could conclude
that the location of Dixon's trial contained the same hallmarks of prejudice that were evident in"
cases finding courtrooms in jails unconstitutional. Id.
However, as the state also acknowledged, it is evident that the district court was quite
familiar with the jail courtroom having "tried several criminal cases" in that location.
Respondent's Brief, p. 10, InA; see also R (39745) 90. The district court and parties were
already familiar with the jail courtroom's appearance and it was thus unnecessary to present
evidence of the jail courtroom's physical appearance for the district court's consideration.
Because Mr. Dixon's counsel argued the jail courtroom's appearance and the district court
referenced its familiarity with that location in its opinion, the appellate record establishes that the
jail courtroom's physical appearance was considered by the district court in determining Mr.
Dixon's claim.
Moreover, a court may take judicial notice of facts that are "not subject to reasonable
dispute" because they are either "(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial

2

court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned." I.R.E. 201(b). The jail courtroom's physical appearance was
known by the district court and the parties and its relevance was argued by Mr. Dixon's counsel.
The district court then referenced its own experience in the courtroom in its written findings.
The district court thus implicitly took judicial notice of the jail courtroom's appearance.
Because the district court considered the jail courtroom's appearance in determining Mr.
Dixon's claims, it is appropriate for this Court to also consider that appearance. While the jail
courtroom's appearance is not "generally" known to this Court, its basic characteristics are
"capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned" within the meaning of Rule 201 (b)(2). Specifically, Ms. Anderson's
affidavit verifies that the physical description argued by post-conviction counsel is accurate.
Further, the official website for the Kootenai County District Court explains that the "two main
court buildings for Kootenai County are located in the Courthouse Complex at the comer of
Government Way and Garden Ave. in Coeur d'Alene." Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. A.
Courtrooms one through eleven are at this location. Id Conversely, courtroom twelve is located
approximately three miles away in the Public Safety Building in the jail on the county sheriffs
campus. Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. A & B. The information on these websites and the
description provided by Ms. Anderson are "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."
Moreover, this information establishes that the jail courtroom carries the "hallmarks of
prejudice" discussed in the pertinent cases. Respondent's Brief, p. 10. For instance, the
Washington Supreme Court reasoned:

3

The difference betweenjailhouses and courthouses is evident even in their
architectural contrast. Courthouses are often monuments of public life, adorned
with architectural flourishes and historical exhibits that make them inviting to
members of the pUblic. Many of our county courthouses are on historical registries
and are visited each year by school children, civic groups, and tourists. A jail, on
the other hand, is singularly utilitarian. Its purpose is to isolate from the public a
segment ofthe population whose actions have been judged grievous enough to
warrant confinement. Jail buildings are typically austere in character, and entrance
is subject to heightened security. Indeed, the Yakima County jail in which Jaime's
trial was held was described by the judge in an unrelated trial as "a monolithic
concrete building."

State v. Jaime, 233 P.3d 554 557 (Wash. 2010).
Similarly, the jail courtroom is within the confines of the jail miles from the courthouse.
To reach the jail courtroom, jurors enter the jail building surrounded by razor wire and pass
throughjail security. See also State v. Lane, 397 N.E.2d 1338, 1339 (Ohio 1979) (trial held in
courtroom within confines of the penitentiary); State v. Cavan, 98 P.3d 381 (Or. 2004)
(courtroom within prison reached after passing through prison security).
The district court considered the jail courtroom's appearance in determining Mr. Dixon's
claim. Moreover, the jail courtroom is separate from the courthouse and within the jail. The
district court erred in not recognizing this setting as inherently prejudicial.
b.

the legal basis for objection to a jury trial held at a jail was
established at the time of Mr. Dixon's trial and the district court
would have erred in holding the jury trial at the jail over Mr. Dixon's
objection

The state also contends that trial counsel was not required to "blaze new trails or pursue a
motion on a novel issue" and that Mr. Dixon was not prejudiced by the failure to ask the district
court to change the trial location because the district court would have denied the motion.
Respondent's Brief, p. 11-12.
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However, as explained in Mr. Dixon's Opening Brief, trial counsel would not have had to
blaze new ground to object to the jury trial being held within the county jail. Appellant's Brief,
p. 9-11. In a small state such as Idaho, the absence of an appellate case directly on point does not
signifY that an issue is novel, particularly in light of the fact that most Idaho trials are conducted
in courthouses, not jails. See also Bright v. State, 875 P.2d 100, 107 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994)
(noting there are few published decisions addressing whether holding a trial inside a prison
violates a defendant's right to a public trial "perhaps on account of our strong tradition of holding
trials in public courthouses").
While there is no Idaho decision directly on point, courts in other jurisdictions have been
addressing the constitutionality of jury trials injails and prisons for decades,2 including a 2004
opinion from our neighbors in Oregon. See Cavan, 98 P.3d at 388 In. 6 (cataloguing opinions on
the topic). Trial counsel was obligated to object to the inherently prejudicial practice of holding
the jury trial within the confines of the county jail.
Further, no compelling state interest justified holding Mr. Dixon's jury trial at the county
jail. Thus, had counsel objected to the trial setting, the district court would have erred in
overruling that objection. Accordingly, Mr. Dixon established that he was prejudiced by
counsel's failure to object to the trial location and the district court erred in denying his petition
for post-conviction relief.

As noted by the state, Mr. Dixon cited cases holding that trials within correctional
settings violate the right to a public trial. Respondent's Brief, p. 9, In. 3. Mr. Dixon is not
attempting to raise a separate claim for violation of the right to a public trial (which was not
presented to the district court). Instead, the reasoning of those cases is similar to the reasoning
discussing the inherently prejudicial nature of trials in correctional settings and are offered for
that purpose.
2
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2.

Mr. Dixon proved that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to
counsel's failure to present physical evidence and/or expert testimony
regarding an injury to Dixon's arm

Counsel was obliged to investigate medical witnesses based on the information provided
by Mr. Dixon. Trial counsel nonetheless did not speak with any ofMr. Dixon's medical
providers or investigate hiring any expert witnesses. This decision was not strategic decision but,
rather, based on counsel's incorrect assumption that no witnesses could be arranged in the
applicable three and one half month time frame. Accordingly, the decision to forgo any
investigation regarding witnesses who could corroborate Mr. Dixon's physical limitations was
unreasonable.
In arguing to the contrary, the state notes that Mr. Dixon did not present medical evidence
in support of his claim and that it was therefore speculative. Respondent's Brief p. 15. While it
would have been preferable to submit medical evidence, sufficient evidence was in the record to
prove Mr. Dixon's claims. Indeed, Mr. Dixon's own testimony establishes the nature of his
limitations and the information his medical providers would have provided. The district court
did not question the credibility ofMr. Dixon's testimony. See R. (39745) p. 93.
Further, it was unreasonable for trial counsel to forgo any and all investigation of medical
witness because of her incorrect belief that several months would be required to develop such
evidence. Moreover, contrary to the state's assertion, such testimony would have likely made a
difference in the verdict. KBG testified that she weighed between eighty and ninety pounds and
the man who kidnaped her actually picked her up. Tr. (33384) p. 66, In. 21

p. 67, In. 6. After

showing the jury the scar, Mr. Dixon testified that it was more noticeable on the day he was
arrested because it was a redder color and he was tanner. ld. at p. 299, In. 9 - p. 300, In. 17.
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KBG did not notice any markings on the perpetrator's arm during their encounter, including
when she grabbed his arm to escape. Id. at p. 67, In. 22 - p. 68, In. 24. There were hundreds of
people in the area, including many people playing basketball near the restrooms, and multiple
ways of accessing the area where the man had KBG. !d. at p. 70, In. 6-10; p. 234, In. 16 - p. 236,
In. 7.
Objective testimony from specialized witnesses regarding Mr. Dixon's physical
limitations at the time of the alleged offense would have corroborated Mr. Dixon's testimony on
that subject and bolstered his explanation that KBG had mistaken him for someone else. As
testified to by the attorney expert, such evidence was "fairly crucial." Tr. (39745) p. 147, In. 1624. Accordingly, Mr. Dixon was prejudiced by counsel's failure to present witnesses regarding
Mr. Dixon's physical limitations.
B.

The District Court Abused its Discretion in Denying Mr. Dixon's Motion to
Reconsider

Post-conviction proceedings were the exclusive means for Mr. Dixon to challenge the
validity of his conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel. His post-conviction attorney
nonetheless failed to provide critical and readily ascertainable information to support his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. In order to provide Mr. Dixon with a meaningful opportunity
to have his claim considered, he should not be penalized for his attorney's failure to introduce
medical evidence in support of his petition and unique and compelling circumstances justified
considering the physical therapist's affidavit. Further, as described more fully in Mr. Dixon's
Opening Brief, information corroborating Mr. Dixon's physical limitations was critical to his
defense. Accordingly, Mr. Dixon established that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
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and the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for relief from judgment.
In response, the state indicates the appellate record does not include the transcript from
Mr. Dixon's hearing on his motion pursuant to LR.C.P. 60(b). Respondent's Brief, p. 18, In.6.
However, the transcript for Docket Number 39745, which undersigned counsel obtained from
this Court, includes the transcript from the "Rule 60(b) hearing" from January 17,2012 at pages
187 to 210. This transcript is cited in Mr. Dixon's Opening Brief. Appellant's Brief, p. 22-23.
It thus appears that the state is mistaken.

The state also argues that Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 228 P .3d 998 (2010) does not
apply to this case because the shortcomings of Mr. Dixon's post-conviction attorney were less
egregious than the post-conviction attorney in that case. However, in Eby, the Court fashioned
an exception to the general rule that "parties are bound by the actions (and failures to act) oftheir
attorneys" applicable solely in post-conviction cases. Mr. Dixon acknowledges that the
circumstances in Eby were far more egregious than in his own. Nonetheless, Mr. Dixon's postconviction attorney failed to provide critical and available information to support Mr. Dixon's
claims. It is unfair to penalize Mr. Dixon for his attorney's shortcomings and the interests of
justice dictate that the additional evidence be considered. These circumstances are thus unique
and compelling within the meaning of Rule 60(b)( 6).
The state also contends that Mr. Dixon argues that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel constitutes unique and compelling circumstances and that this argument is
being raised for the first time on appeal. However, Mr. Dixon argues that he should not be
bound by his post-conviction attorney's inaction consistent with the Court's interpretation of
Rule 60(b)(6) in Eby. While Mr. Dixon did not raise this specific argument in support of his
8

motion to reconsider, the motion specifically cites Rule 60(b)(6).
Mr. Dixon should not be held accountable for his post-conviction attorney's failure to
support his claim with medical evidence. Accordingly, the district court should have
reconsidered it decision in light of the new medical evidence.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Dixon's Opening Brief, he respectfully asks
this Court to reverse the district court's judgment denying his post-conviction claims and his
motion for relief from judgment and to remand this case for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this

~day of April, 2014.
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ay of April, 2014, I caused two true and correct
copies of the foregoing to be mailed to: Office of the Attorney General, Criminal Law Division,
P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0010.

Robyn Fyffe
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